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AGAINST SECRET REGULATION: WHY AND HOW WE
SHOULD END THE PRACTICAL OBSCURITY OF
INJUNCTIONS AND CONSENT DECREES
Margo Schlanger*
INTRODUCTION
Every year, federal and state courts put in place orders that regulate
the prospective operations of certainly hundreds and probably
thousands of large government and private enterprises. Injunctions
and injunction-like settlement agreements-whether styled consent
decrees, settlements, conditional dismissals, or some other more crea-
tive title-bind the activities of employers, polluters, competitors,
lenders, creditors, property holders, schools, housing authorities, po-
lice departments, jails, prisons, nursing homes, and many others. The
types of law underlying these cases multiply just as readily: consumer
lending, environmental, employment, anti-discrimination, education,
constitutional, and so on. Injunctive orders, whether reached by liti-
gation or on consent, suffuse the regulatory environment, instructing
the covered entities not only what they may not do, but also what they
must do and how they must do it. Moreover, the reach of injunctions
can extend well past their explicit scope because injunctive orders can
serve as models for broader regulation or legislation and can set the
boundaries of a regulatory agency's enforcement efforts.
But as this Article develops, notwithstanding the individual and col-
lective importance of all these injunctions, they languish in practical
obscurity, unavailable to all but the extraordinarily persevering re-
searcher who joins inside information with abundant funds. For this
Clifford Symposium on civil justice, I describe the problem, argue that
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; Director, Civil Rights Litigation
Clearinghouse, http://clearinghouse.net (on leave, 2010, to serve as Civil Rights & Civil Liberties
Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; this Article was written prior to that appoint-
ment, and the views expressed are not those of the U.S. government). Many thanks to Steve
Landsman for inviting me to the Fifteenth Annual Clifford Symposium. The project described in
this Article, which deals with litigation brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, is supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES-0718831, and conducted by four
collaborating researchers: Pauline Kim, Andrew Martin, Christina Boyd, and me. Thanks to my
coauthors on that project and our research assistants for their work that I use here. And thanks
to Pauline Kim and to (as always) Sam Bagenstos for helpful comments.
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the situation is unacceptable in the modern information era, and pro-
pose a solution.
II. WHAT SECRET REGULATION? THE PRACTICAL
OBSCURITY OF INJUNCTIONS
Obscurity is not so problematic if the obscure information is unim-
portant, or important only to a very limited number of people. So the
first issue is, Who might want to read and understand injunctive or-
ders? Obviously the parties and the enforcing courts. There is no ob-
scurity here; these people either write the orders in question or
receive them as a matter of right. But is there any broader audience,
for whom obscurity is a more serious problem? Subdivide the ques-
tion according to the type of party. Both the plaintiffs who succeed in
obtaining these orders and the defendants who are covered by the
orders can be federal, state, or local governmental agencies. If either
or both parties are government agencies, then there is an obvious pub-
lic interest in increasing access to the injunctions. A basic commit-
ment to democratic self-governance requires that governmental
activities not be kept secret when no important purpose is served by
the secrecy. So when the government is a plaintiff in an injunctive
case, members of the public should want to know how it is enforcing
the law, and potential defendants should want to know what they
might be pressured to do. Likewise, when the government is a defen-
dant, the public has an important interest in understanding how its
activities are circumscribed or unleashed by a decree. Even, however,
when both parties to an injunction are private, the resolution of litiga-
tion requires governmental involvement because injunctions accom-
pany court orders, rather than some private method of enforcement.
Therefore, because all injunctions involve government, democracy re-
quires that public disclosure accompany state involvement.
Yet it turns out that most injunctive orders are not public, or at least
not effectively so. They are filed with courts and then hidden away in
court archives. They are typically difficult to obtain, as a collection or
a single source, even for the well-funded and well-informed. They are
not embedded in an easily usable information infrastructure. Even a
person who knows the type of case or its caption, its filing date, and its
court, may or may not be able to obtain a particular injunction for a
reasonable fee. The most persevering experts struggle and probably
fail to find all the injunctions obtained by or against most government
agencies, or all the injunctions about a specified subject.
The difficulty is quite separate from the ordinary issue of confiden-
tial settlements, where parties settle litigation by an agreement that is
[Vol. 59:515
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not shared with the public in any way; in fact, a promise of secrecy in
such cases is usually extracted from the plaintiff by a defendant who
hopes to avoid both a public relations hit and the revelation of evi-
dence that might encourage more litigation. It is the confidentiality of
such settlements that renders them unobservable and, therefore, less
able to influence the future behavior of defendants or litigants.' In-
junctions, by contrast, are rarely confidential; they are embodied in
public documents and disclosable by the parties at will. Yet injunc-
tions remain shielded from public view by what privacy experts call
"practical obscurity," although that phrase is more often employed to
celebrate the shielding of personal information from prying eyes
rather than to critique the unavailability of regulatory information to
citizens.2
Injunctions are court orders, so one might think that they would be
embodied in court opinions, which are accessible to and searchable
by, most prominently, subscribers of Westlaw or Lexis. Think again.
Opinions are rare in any event,3 but they are essentially nonexistent in
the absence of a contested issue, and most injunctions are uncontested
settlements. An opinion might accompany entry of a decree after a
fairness hearing in a class action. If, however, there is no class ac-
tion-if, for example, the plaintiff is an enforcement agency rather
than a class of individuals-no such hearing is required and no opin-
ion is issued. Injunctions are also regulatory, so one might expect that
an injunction involving a government agency as a litigating party
would be reprinted in the Code of Federal Regulations or perhaps
noticed in the Federal Register. This is, it turns out, routine in envi-
1. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991); Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimi-
nation, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927 (2006); Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (Or,
What You Don't Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHics 115 (1999).
2. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780
(1989). In the phrase's more ordinary usage relating to individuals, it has become commonplace
to note that e-filing has now over-lit previously useful shadows. For example, privacy and tech-
nology expert Rebecca Hulse states flatly that "'[p]ractical obscurity' (the term coined for the de
facto privacy litigants enjoyed because of practical difficulties associated with accessing dusty
paper court files) is effectively dead." Rebecca Hulse, E-Filing and Privacy: What Every Lawyer
Needs to Know, 24 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2009, at 14, 17. Hulse is not wrong, but she and I are
talking about different types of information, and accordingly, different types of obscurity.
Hulse's subject is litigant privacy, which e-filing allows to be subverted by focused textual
searches using proper names. My subject is information that these kinds of textual searches
cannot reliably retrieve.
3. Only five to ten percent of cases terminated in the federal district courts have written opin-
ions. See Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for Research, Teaching,
and Policymaking. The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L. REV. 155, 163-65
(2006) (summarizing previous studies and describing a new study that confirms prior estimates of
the prevalence of written opinions).
2010]
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ronmental law, and in antitrust and other consumer-protection law,4
but nearly unheard of in most other areas. 5
Can closer or more determined observers of federal agencies use
other methods to uncover injunctive orders? This is more difficult
than one would guess. To understand how injunctions resist even the
most determined search consider the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or Commission), the lead federal agency charged
with enforcing federal statutes that forbid employment discrimination
based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age, and disability.
In a project examining the EEOC's litigation in federal district courts
in cases filed from 1997 to 2006, my coauthors (Pauline Kim, Andrew
Martin, and Christina Boyd) and I painstakingly assembled a great
deal of information about the agency's docket.6 The EEOC files 300
4. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
5. In a Westlaw search of the Federal Register from 2000 to present, I found just one such
posting. See 65 Fed. Reg. 33,578 (May 24, 2000) (soliciting objections to an Americans with
Disability Act consent decree in United States v. City & County of Denver, No. 96-K-370 (D.
Colo.). The Code of Federal Regulations and the Federal Register do occasionally include hints
that court orders and consent decrees have a binding effect on federal agencies. For example,
HUD [Department of Housing and Urban Development] may nevertheless restrict the
family's right to lease such a unit anywhere in such jurisdiction if HUD determines that
limitations on a family's opportunity to select among available units in that jurisdiction
are appropriate to achieve desegregation goals in accordance with obligations gener-
ated by a court order or consent decree.
24 C.F.R. §982.353(a) (2009); accord Paroling, Recommitting, and Supervising Federal Prisoners,
68 Fed. Reg. 3389 (Jan. 24, 2003) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 2); Comment Request for
Review of a Revised and Expiring Information Collection, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,968 (Aug. 1, 2002);
Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Comment Request, 66 Fed. Reg. 18,783 (Apr. 11,
2001); Notice of Submission of Proposed Information Collection, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,443 (Oct. 3,
2001). Even with respect to such hints, however, environmental and antitrust law loom large.
For example, one regulation states the following:
On March 19, 1984, the State submitted five consent decrees entered by the State of
Illinois with the Circuit Court for the Third Judicial Circuit of Madison County and
filed March 16, 1984, for incorporation in the lead plan. These include People of.the
State of Illinois vs. Taracorp, Inc.; People of the State of Illinois vs. St. Louis Lead Re-
cyclers; People of the State of Illinois vs. First Granite City National Bank; People of the
State of Illinois, vs. Stackorp Inc.; and People of the State of Illinois vs. B. V. and G. V.
Transport Company.
40 C.F.R. § 52.720(c)(53) (2008); accord 40 C.F.R. § 52.1322(c)(95)(i)(B) (2008); 40 C.F.R. § 136,
app. A, method 1624 (2008); 40 C.F.R. § 403, app. D; 47 C.F.R. § 51.5 (2008); 47 C.F.R.
§ 53.201(a)(2) (2008); Public Hearings for Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
Nitrogen Dioxide, 74 Fed. Reg. 34,290 (July 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50); Energy
Conservation Program: Test Procedures for Small Electric Motors, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,059, 32,060
n.5 (July 7, 2009) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 431); Energy Conservation Program for Con-
sumer Products: Test Procedures for Clothes Dryers and Room Air Conditioners, 73 Fed. Reg.
74,639, 74,643 n.11 (Dec. 9, 2008) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430).
6. Full information about this study, including the replication code for the results described,
will be available in 2010 at http://eeoclitigation.wustl.edu.
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to 400 antidiscrimination cases in federal district court each year,7 and
it settles or wins the large majority of them: defendants win only six
percent, and the EEOC withdraws its claim in another two percent.8
Nearly all of the EEOC's successful cases-ninety-five percent of
those we were able to assess 9-result in at least minor injunctive re-
lief, and many result in quite detailed injunctions.' 0 These decrees
regulate the firms sued by the EEOC for a period of time between
eighteen months and several years after the decree is entered.
The EEOC's regulation-by-injunction is hardly ever confidential;
the Commission has a strong policy against confidential settlement
and it enforces that policy notwithstanding defendants' frequent
counter-requests. The EEOC instructs its attorneys:
Once the Commission has filed suit, the agency will not enter into
settlements that are subject to confidentiality provisions, it will re-
quire public disclosure of all settlement terms, and it will oppose the
sealing of resolution documents. The principle of openness in gov-
ernment dictates that Congress, the media, stakeholders, and the
general public should have access to the results of the agency's liti-
gation activities, so that they can assess whether the Commission is
using its resources appropriately and effectively. Additionally, one
of the principal purposes of enforcement actions under the antidis-
crimination statutes is to deter violations by the party being sued
and by other entities subject to the laws. Other entities cannot be
7. The EEOC also files other types of actions, for example to enforce its administrative sub-
poenas and to enforce out-of-court settlements. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT
COMM'N, EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS, FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2008 (2009), http://archive.
eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html. More complete data from the information management system
will be posted in early 2010 at http://eeoclitigation.wustl.edu.
8. An additional three percent of our sample do not yet have an outcome. Because of our
study design, the figures in the text refer to the first outcome in district court, prior to any
appeals or post-judgment settlements. But there are very few appeals or post-judgment settle-
ments; therefore, they do not substantially affect the analysis.
9. In cases settled by voluntary dismissal rather than by a consent judgment or settlement
agreement, the injunctive part of the settlement, if any, is often not filed with the court and may
therefore be unobservable by reading court files. In addition, in some districts during some
years of our period, settlement documents were not digitized, and are likewise unobservable to
us without special effort and expense (which we undertook in over one hundred cases). Of the
cases in which the EEOC settled or won, we ascertained the existence of injunctive relief in
sixty-eight percent of the cases and its absence in just three percent. In other words, as stated in
the text, injunctive relief appears in ninety-five percent of the cases in which the EEOC obtained
relief at all and for which we have full information. The proportion for the remainder is un-
known, but it seems unlikely that full figures would differ markedly from the known portion of
the sample, given that the absence of information is so often due to the district's digitization
program, not anything specific to the case.
10. The mean length of the 1,227 injunctions we have copies of (out of 1,409 injunctions we
know about) is nine pages; the median is seven pages, and the longest ten percent are fifteen or
more pages in length.
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deterred by the relief obtained in a particular case unless they learn
what that relief was.
Therefore, resolutions of Commission suits must contain all set-
tlement terms and be filed in the public court record. Further, the
Commission must be free to respond fully to inquiries regarding the
suit and resolution, and to provide upon request the resolution doc-
uments and any nonprivileged case related documents. Commission
attorneys should oppose attempts to seal or otherwise prevent pub-
lic access to resolution documents, and if, over the Commission's
objections, a court issues an order preventing such access, the Re-
gional Attorney should notify the Associate General Counsel for
Litigation Management Services immediately and submit a written
recommendation regarding appeal of the order.'
In accordance with these views, the EEOC publicizes the outcomes of
some of its cases, 12 and newspaper articles and the like often describe
the results. So confidentiality is not the source of the obscurity of the
EEOC's injunctive orders.
Nevertheless, the EEOC's injunctions remain obscure. Why? First,
the EEOC's press releases cover only a small portion of the EEOC's
docket and do not include the decrees themselves. In addition, only
about ten percent of the EEOC's cases have any judicial opinions at
all, in district court or appellate court, making them similar to the fed-
eral district court docket as a whole. 13 Most of these opinions, moreo-
ver, do not deal with the injunctive relief granted but concern other
issues such as liability, damages, or attorneys fees. Accordingly, to
find the decrees requires recourse to the district court clerks' offices.
There, they are available for free in-person examination for several
years, until the files are archived. This access is, however, simply in-
sufficient to end the practical obscurity of the injunctions, mostly be-
cause documents within a court clerk's office are accessible only to
those who know both which court to contact and the name of the de-
11. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, REGIONAL ATTORNEYS' MANUAL pt.
3, at 58 (2005) [hereinafter REGIONAL ATTORNEYS' MANUAL], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/litigation/manual/index.html. The Department of Justice has a similar policy:
It is the policy of the Department of Justice that, in any civil matter in which the De-
partment is representing the interests of the United States or its agencies, it will not
enter into final settlement agreements or consent decrees that are subject to confidenti-
ality provisions, nor will it seek or concur in the sealing of such documents. This policy
flows from the principle of openness in government and is consistent with the Depart-
ment's policies regarding openness in judicial proceedings (see 28 CFR 50.9) and the
Freedom of Information Act (see Memorandum for Heads of Departments and Agen-
cies from the Attorney General Re: The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 4, 1993).
28 C.F.R. § 50.23(a) (2008). "[R]are circumstances" may "warrant an exception to this general
rule." 28 C.F.R. § 50.23(b) (2008).
12. See EEOC, EEOC Press Releases, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/index.cfm (last
visited Dec. 19, 2009).
13. See Schlanger & Lieberman, supra note 3, at 164.
[Vol. 59:515
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fendant firm or the case docket number. In addition, once the
searcher finds the file, it has to be copied. Copying paper files in dis-
trict court clerks' offices typically costs $.50 per page; if the file has
been archived, there is usually a per-case fee of perhaps $50 or more
to retrieve the box of files. Copying is easiest in-person, but that adds
travel costs. (Most district court clerks' offices will mail the copies,
but only after a cumbersome process in which office staff retrieves the
file, counts the requested pages, bills the requester, receives a check,
and then makes and mails the copies.) If the litigation took place in a
district court that insists on or allows digital filing, a digitized version
of a decree may be available at the much cheaper rate of $.08 per page
with a maximum of $2.40 per document.' 4 But even now, some dis-
trict courts digitize very little more than the docket sheet itself, and
such incomplete digitization used to be far more prevalent. Besides,
locating a digitized decree often requires the same type of case-spe-
cific information needed to locate a hard-copy file.
How then might an interested member of the public go about find-
ing not an already-identified EEOC decree but any EEOC decrees
that meet particular criteria? Suppose our curious inquirer wanted to
examine all of the EEOC's decrees in a particular geographic area or
industry, or all those decrees that had certain characteristics such as
racial hiring goals. Putting our project to one side, the current answer
is that such a researcher is simply out of luck. There is no hope of
getting the information from the courts, which do not index their law-
suits except by a few variables, all of which are irrelevant here.' 5 The
plaintiffs'-side employment discrimination bar is quite robust, but
there is no private firm or organization that collects the information or
relevant documents. In short, nobody but the EEOC has even close
to the information that one would need in order to give our intrepid
researcher the list she needs to go back to the courthouses and gather
documents.
So can she meet her research need by asking the EEOC for the
information? The answer is basically no. Even if the EEOC wanted
to give her everything she asked for, the agency would be unable to
satisfy her request. The EEOC could, if it chose, give the researcher a
list of all of its cases, as it did my coauthors and me, or even a list of all
of its race cases, equal pay act cases, or hiring or firing cases. But the
14. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule
(2008), http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/documents/epa_feesched.pdf.
15. For a list of the variables by which federal court cases are indexed, see Codebook for Civil
Terminations Data, 2008, Federal Judicial Center, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Database
(ICPSR Study No. 25002, 2008), available at www.icpsr.umich.edu.
2010]
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EEOC's computerized information system includes no metadata on
decree terms. A researcher-a reporter, a voter, an academic-can
submit an information request to the EEOC seeking all the cases that
involve a particular decree term, but her request will of necessity be
returned unfilled. Like everyone else, the EEOC simply does not
keep the information.
So how can our researcher move from a list of all of the EEOC's
cases to the subset she needs, or to the decrees themselves? One
might expect this large and centralized federal litigating agency to
have some kind of a reading room-a single repository of decrees or
case files. No such luck. Even the Commission's Office of General
Counsel has not in the past routinely retained copies of case docu-
ments.16 And even the offices that litigated the cases that led to the
decrees do not keep long-term records of them; they send their hard
copy case files to archives after a few years.17 So there is no single
office or even handful of offices at which the information in question
is stored.
The end result, before our project, was that the EEOC's large in-
junctive docket was essentially available for evaluation only after we
undertook the enormously time consuming and expensive project of
gathering thousands of documents via the federal court's electronic
docketing system, Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(PACER), 18 and the U.S. District Court Clerk's Offices. The docu-
ments we gathered are now posted on the Internet, embedded in a
usable information structure. But without our postings, if some inter-
ested non-litigant wants to assess the conduct of the regulated parties
against their decretal obligations, such assessment will fail unless the
non-litigant knows about and finds the decree.
Yet the EEOC is not unusual. True, a few federal litigating agencies
collect and post records of all their administrative and court actions.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission are two examples.1 9 But the largest federal litigat-
ing agency of all, the Department of Justice (DOJ), is a very mixed
bag. Some DOJ components do make public some portion of their
injunctive docket, although a searcher must know where to look to
16. Telephone interview with Jacinta Ma, Counsel to Acting Chair, EEOC (Apr. 20, 2009).
17. Id.
18. For information about PACER, see Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER
Service Center, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2009).
19. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Documents, http://www.ftc.gov/os/filing-types.shtm (last visited
Sept. 4, 2009); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Settlements, http://www.ferc.gov/legal/settle
ments.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2009); Fed. Energy Regulation Comm'n, Court Cases, http://
www.ferc.gov/legal/court-cases.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).
[Vol. 59:515
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even begin gathering recent orders that the Department obtained as
plaintiff.20 Other DOJ components post only proposed decrees (for
public comment) but not final ones.21 For most of the Department of
Justice, as for the EEOC, no reading room or centralized public infor-
mation source exists.22
Things only get murkier when the researcher is interested in the
government as defendant rather than the government as plaintiff.
With the exception of the billion-dollar case concerning the federal
government's operation of the Indian Trust Fund,23 it appears that the
DOJ offices that defend the United States against injunctive (or
other) suits do not make public any resulting orders.24 And with strik-
ingly few exceptions, one tends to look in vain on agency websites or
searchable databases for evidence of such court orders, which con-
strain the federal agencies' activities.25 Proving a negative is hard, of
course, but I see no sign of any injunctions governing the conduct of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, for example, notwithstanding a num-
20. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Division, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/ (last
visited Aug. 25, 2009) (Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section); U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Civil Rights Division, http://www.justice.gov/crt/emp/papers.php (last visited Dec. 19, 2009)
(Civil Rights Division, Employment Litigation Section); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Con-
sumer Litigation, http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/ocl/index.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2009) (Civil Divi-
sion, Office of Consumer Litigation). For most of the DOJ's Civil Division, a few settlements
appear to be available, but only by beginning at http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/, then clicking on
"Civil Division FOIA," then on "Electronic Reading Room," then on "Frequently Requested
Records" and then on the relevant year and case name.
21. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Proposed Consent Decrees, http://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/Consent-
Decrees.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2009). Making certain proposed decrees available for public
comment is required by the regulations that implement the environmental laws. See 28 C.F.R.
§ 50.7(a) (2008). Once the comment period concludes, the decrees are taken down.
22. The Environment and Natural Resources Division retains the consent decrees it is re-
quired to post for comment, but it does not post them online. See supra note 21. Copies of any
particular decree entered in 1973 or later are available upon written request and payment ($.25
per page) to the Division, which will also provide a list of them, if asked. E-mail from Tonia
Fleetwood, Environment and Natural Resources Division, to author (July 16, 2009, 09:48 CST).
23. The case is currently captioned Cobell v. Salazar; it has been the subject of dozens of
published opinions, the most recent of which appeared at 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
24. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Cobell v. Salazar, http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/cases/cobell/index.
htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2009) (posting documents from the Cobell litigation). To arrive at this
URL, one must start at the Civil Division Homepage, http://www.usdoj.gov/civiU, click on the
"Commercial Litigation Branch," and then click on "Cobell v. Kempthorne, et al." For plain-
tiffs' information about the Cobell litigation, see Indian Trust, Cobell v. Salazar, http://www.
cobellsettlement.com/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2009). The DOJ office that does most of the work
defending the federal government against actions for injunctive as well as monetary relief is the
Civil Division's Federal Programs Branch; its site includes no injunctions or other orders. See
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Programs Branch, http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/Federal%20Progr
ams.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).
25. See REGIONAL ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 11, at 58; 28 C.F.R. § 50.23(a)-(b).
HeinOnline  -- 59 DePaul L. Rev. 523 2009-2010
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ber of injunctions that have been entered against it in recent years.26
State agencies that are involved in injunctive litigation as either plain-
tiff or defendant are varied, but most seem to disclose very little of
their activities or court-ordered regulation.
This state of affairs has always existed, which might counsel accept-
ance or at least resignation about the situation. But that would be
wrong, I believe. What has changed, crucially, is that current technol-
ogy can easily solve the obscurity of regulation-by-injunction. Public
agencies bring and defend lawsuits with substantial regulatory effect,
and public courts enforce regulatory regimes so derived. Modern in-
formation science simply makes it intolerable for these organizations
to fail to facilitate access that would allow the public to monitor and
evaluate the results.
III. THE SOLUTION TO PRACTICAL OBSCURITY:
LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSES
What we need is a way to collect, index, and make accessible injunc-
tive decrees. The "Web 1.0" answer would have been for each gov-
ernment agency to post its decrees on a list.27 This is clearly feasible.
In fact, this approach, which is required by federal regulations that
long pre-date the Internet, has been used in environmental law and
consumer protection but not other areas of law. The opportunity to
comment on proposed environmental consent decrees-and therefore
the existence of the decrees themselves-is noticed in the Federal
Register, whether those decrees are negotiated by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice 28 or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
(The EPA leaves the resulting decrees accessible on the Internet; the
DOJ, oddly, takes them down after the close of the comment period.)
Antitrust decrees involving the U.S. Department of Justice and the
FTC's decrees are treated similarly.2 9
26. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, http://www.bop.gov/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2009). For injunc-
tions, see Jordan v. Pugh, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1126 (D. Colo. 2007); Jordan v. Hood, No. 03-cv-
02320 (D. Colo. Oct. 26, 2006), available at http://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5499; Gartrell
v. Ashcroft, 191 F. Supp. 2d 23, 40-41 (D.D.C. 2002); Washington v. Reno, No. 93-217, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22245 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 11, 1995), available at http://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?
id=717 (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).
27. See TERRY FLEW, NEW MEDIA: AN INTRODucrION (3d ed. 2007).
28. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.7(a), (c).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2006) (requiring DOJ antitrust decrees to be published in the Fed-
eral Register); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Case Filings, http:l/www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases.html
(last visited Aug. 25, 2009) (posting proposed and final decrees, along with other case filings); see
also 16 C.F.R. § 2.34(c) (2009) (stating that the FTC will post decrees and solicit comments).
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Even now, this would be a major improvement in many areas of
litigation-particularly in areas in which the United States is a defen-
dant rather than a plaintiff. But the "Web 2.0" solution 30 is far better.
Government agencies certainly should post decrees and other docu-
mentation for cases in which they are involved either as plaintiff or
defendant. In fact, this should, like regulatory postings,31 be central-
ized. Courts should do the same when they function as prospective
regulators. 32 But additional tailored processing, indexing, and presen-
tation could then be done by non-governmental firms or organiza-
tions. This is, proponents of open government agree, the best model
for government data.33
Several law schools have already developed clearinghouses that
travel some portion of this road, without the assistance of the central-
ized posting just proposed. The Stanford Securities Class Action Liti-
gation Clearinghouse 34 was the first, followed by the Civil Rights
Litigation Clearinghouse, 35 which I founded, and the Stanford Intel-
lectual Property Clearinghouse. 36 Some public interest organizations
operate limited-access clearinghouses as well.37 The Civil Rights Liti-
gation Clearinghouse is the only one of these clearinghouse sites that
focuses on injunctions. The site began in 1998 as a collection of docu-
ments in my office-accumulated with great effort and at great ex-
30. See FLEW, supra note 27; TiM O'REILLY & JOHN BAT-rELLE, WEB SQUARED: WEB 2.0
FIVE YEARS ON (2009), http://assets.en.oreilly.com/l/event/28/web2009_websquared-whitepaper
.pdf.
31. The website, http://www.regulations.gov, has been operating since 2003 under the Federal
E-Government eRulemaking Initiative. See Regulations.gov, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#faqs (last visited Sept. 4, 2009).
32. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 496 (2009).
33. See, e.g., David Robinson, Harlan Yu, William P. Zeller & Edward W. Felten, Government
Data and the Invisible Hand, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 160 (2009); Open Government Working
Group, Open Government Data Principles, http://wiki.opengovdata.org/index.php/OpenData
Principles (last visited Sept. 4, 2009); Joshua Tauberer, Open Data Is Civic Capital: Best Prac-
tices for "Open Government Data" (unpublished manuscript July 20, 2009), http://razor.occams.
info/pubdocs/opendataciviccapital.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2009); Clay Johnson, III, Policies
for Federal Agency Public Websites (Dec. 17, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/memoranda/fy2005/m05-04.pdf ("Provide all data in an open, industry standard format per-
mitting users to aggregate, disaggregate, or otherwise manipulate and analyze the data to meet
their needs."), Improving Access to Government Through Better Use of the Web: W3C Interest
Group Note (May 12, 2009), available at http://www.w3.org/TR/egov-improving/.
34. Stanford Law School, Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, http://securities.stanford.
edu/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2009)
35. University of Michigan Law School, Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, http://clearing
house.net (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).
36. Stanford Law School, IP Litigation Clearinghouse, http://www.law.stanford.edu/programl
centersliplc/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2009).
37. See, e.g., American Immigration Law Foundation, Legal Action Center, http://www.ailf.
org/lac/lac lit index.shtml (last visited Sept. 4, 2009).
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pense as I conducted research into civil rights injunctions-indexed on
a simple spreadsheet. In 2006, with the generous support of the
School of Law at Washington University in St. Louis, I arranged for
the documents to be scanned, with optical character recognition in or-
der to make them searchable. In addition, I assigned research assist-
ants to search PACER and Westlaw for more documents in every
included case. The research assistants then indexed and cross-indexed
the cases by participant, date, jurisdiction, case-type, issue, etc., and
wrote case summaries. These data and summaries were checked and
rechecked by lawyers and others.
The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse launched as a public web-
site in November 2006 with about a thousand cases and several thou-
sand documents, as well as citations and links to thousands of
additional court opinions for those Internet users with access to
Westlaw or Lexis. The Clearinghouse opened with a focus on several
particular categories of civil rights cases, especially policing cases, and
institutional conditions cases governing jails, prisons, and facilities
housing juvenile offenders, people with mental illnesses, and people
with intellectual disabilities. In each category, the emphasis was on
cases that sought policy or operational change, as opposed to mone-
tary compensation for unconstitutional misconduct.
In the years since its launch, the Civil Rights Litigation Clearing-
house has continued to expand. We have added case types, which now
number twenty-one. (A table at the end of this Article lists and de-
scribes them, including the number of cases and documents available
for each type.) We have also added cases and documents. Now spon-
sored by the University of Michigan Law School, the Clearinghouse
currently posts at least partial information for nearly 5,300 cases, in-
cluding, for each, a litigation summary as well as over 16,000 dockets,
complaints, filings, settlements, court orders, and other documents,
and citations (and links) to nearly 5,000 opinions. Thousands of addi-
tional cases are in progress. The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse
includes the most comprehensive collection ever assembled not only
of prison, jail, and policing injunctive cases, but also of immigration
and fair lending class actions. We have collections of cases relating to
disability rights, nursing homes, the operation of public defenders' of-
fices, the administration of the death penalty, and many more. And
we are well along in a project of assembling and processing by far the
most comprehensive collection ever of injunctive employment cases.
(This case category includes not only the EEOC cases described
above, but also private class actions and cases brought by the U.S.
Department of Justice.)
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The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse has several characteris-
tics that are necessary to solve the informational deficit that is the
subject of this Article. Most important, (a) it is large, (b) its cases are
indexed and searchable, and (c) the most relevant documents are in-
cluded. On the other hand, it is limited in two key ways. Given the
current staff and budget, and the absence of any obligation on any
party or court to make documents and information accessible, we
have been unable to implement a systematic and effective method for
discovering the relevant cases or updating them once they are incor-
porated into the site. What is needed is a partnership between the
government agencies that bring, defend, and decide injunctive litiga-
tion, and nongovernmental information-developers who can slice, an-
alyze, package, and present the data. Such partnerships need not be
negotiated, however; they will be enabled if the government simply
posts decree data using modern information techniques. The result
will be, finally, public access to the injunctive court orders that govern
so much of American activity.
2010]
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